


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WHAT IS A QUALITY SOLDIER?

by

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COLONEL RODNEY W. SYMONS, AR
LIEUTENANT COLONEL RALPH W. BILBERRY, AG
LIEUTENANT COLONEL MEREDITH H. CARAM, IN
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN S. LUALLIN, IN
LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD S. MASON, MI

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
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than non-grads and those with lower mental category AFQT scores. In the field survey a convenience sample of 1829 soldiers from line units, training units, and recruiters was conducted to obtain their perceptions of quality as related to intelligence, motivation, attitude, discipline and technical competence. The major conclusions of the survey were that motivation, positive attitude, and self-discipline are the most desired qualities in a soldier. These factors buttress both the literature and Army recruiting policy since high school graduate soldiers normally have better attitudes, motivation and self-discipline as measured by their higher retention and lower misconduct rates. The low emphasis on intelligence and technical competence by survey respondents is not entirely in consonance with the Army recruiting policy of emphasizing the enlisting of individuals in AFQT Mental Category I-III A. The field survey indicated a well-disciplined and motivated soldier regardless of intelligence is the one with whom they preferred to serve. One conclusion is that the field respondents would be satisfied with Mental Category IIIBs and IVs as long as the acceptable value system displayed by motivation, attitude, and discipline was present. Overwhelmingly, the survey revealed early home and neighborhood environment (socialization process) is perceived to be the major determinant of quality with basic and advanced individual training having much less of an impact on a soldier's quality. Respondents indicated that discipline is the Army's biggest problem, and further, today's soldier is believed to be less disciplined than in previous years (1977-1980). In other areas, today's soldier is considered about the same as those entering the Army in 1977-1980. The study concludes that the Army must place greater emphasis on the middle class, non-alienated youth, whose socialization and internalization of norms have created a set of values which are compatible with and reinforce the values of the Army.

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MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

WHAT IS A QUALITY SOLDIER?

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

BY

COLONEL RODNEY W. SYMONS, AR
LIEUTENANT COLONEL RALPH W. BILBERRY, AG
LIEUTENANT COLONEL MEREDITH H. CARAM, IN
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN S. LUALLIN, IN
LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD S. MASON, MI

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13 MAY 1982

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AUTHORS: R. W. Symons, COL, AR; R. W. Bilberry, LTC, AG;
M. H. Caram, LTC, IN; J. S. Luallin, LTC, IN;
R. S. Mason, LTC, MI

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The question is what is a Quality Soldier?

The purpose of this study was to investigate and determine "What is a Quality Soldier." The study includes an extensive review of the literature and a field survey. The review of the literature shows that the Army recruiting policy emphasis on high school graduates and Mental Category I-IIIA is based on statistical data. Enlistees meeting the high school graduate and Mental Category I-IIIA requirement tend to be more motivated toward completion of initial enlistment, have fewer discipline problems, and are less alienated in a sociopolitical sense than non-grads and those with lower mental category AFQT scores. In the field survey a convenience sample of 1829 soldiers from line units, training units, and recruiters was conducted to obtain their perceptions of quality as related to intelligence, motivation, attitude, discipline and technical competence. The major conclusions of the survey were that motivation, positive attitude, and self-discipline are the most desired qualities in a soldier. These factors buttress both the literature and Army recruiting policy since high school graduate soldiers normally have better attitudes, motivation and self-discipline as measured by their higher retention and lower misconduct rates. The low emphasis on intelligence and technical competence by survey respondents is not entirely in consonance with the Army recruiting policy of emphasizing the enlisting of individuals in AFQT Mental Category I-IIIA. The field survey indicated a well-disciplined and motivated soldier regardless of intelligence is the one with whom they preferred to serve. One conclusion is that the field respondents would be satisfied with Mental Category IIIBs and IVs as long as the acceptable value system displayed by motivation, attitude, and discipline was present. Overwhelmingly, the survey revealed early home and neighborhood environment (socialization process) is perceived to be the major determinant of quality with basic and advanced individual training having much less of an impact on a soldier's quality. Respondents indicated that discipline is the Army's biggest problem, and further, today's soldier is believed to be less disciplined than in previous years (1977-1980). In other areas, today's soldier is considered about the same as those entering the Army in 1977-1980. The study concludes that the Army must place greater

emphasis on the middle class, non-alienated youth, whose socialization and internalization of norms have created a set of values which are compatible with and reinforce the values of the Army.

PREFACE

This Group Study Project was produced under the aegis of the US Army War College. The scope and general methodology were decided by the study group with advice from members of the College Staff and Faculty. This study is designed to supplement the overall efforts of the Department of the Army to assess the attributes of a quality soldier and, thus, improve the morale and efficiency of the Army. The five authors elected to participate in the study based on their prior experiences in the Army and their current interest in the subject. They have attempted to conduct the study without being constrained by the existing policies of any DOD agency or service. The outstanding administrative assistance by the USAWC and the installations visited were key to our being able to complete this study.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

For over eight years now, our Nation has devoted considerable resources to recruiting sufficient numbers of qualified people for its All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The AVF is comprised of all Active and Reserve Components of the Armed Forces of the United States. As a component of the AVF, the Army is devoted to recruiting enough people each year to meet authorized strength levels and, at the same time, to establish and maintain a force of high-quality personnel. Quality, however, is one of the most debated issues for the Army and the other services. Arguments usually center on the newly recruited enlisted soldier and, amidst ambiguity and lack of consensus regarding the definition of a quality soldier, there is a continuous stream of opinions that the Army is largely attracting and enlisting low-quality people.

Thus, the question, "What is a Quality Soldier?", is a major problem facing the Army and its resolution is important to high morale and efficiency. In this study, we propose to determine the attributes of a quality enlisted soldier. Our goal is to pull together the findings of previous research, the views of reputable experts on the subject, criteria used by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Army (DA) as indicators of quality, and the views of officers and

enlisted personnel in the Army to establish a consensus on what constitutes a quality enlisted soldier. We start with the hypothesis that quality is a product of a number of characteristics (to include intelligence, attitude, motivation, self-discipline, training, leadership, and the individual socialization process). Further, we hypothesized that various tools and methods (high school diploma, mental and physical test results, background inquiry) can reliably assist in determining quality before enlistment.

Procedures for Investigation and Analysis

Our study methodology includes the collection of data through research of existing literature and the conduct of a opinion survey. The search of literature includes studies sponsored by DOD, DA and other agencies; publications which outline DOD and DA policy; and studies and articles by reputable public servants and private citizens. The primary tool of investigation is a written opinion survey administered randomly to soldiers in the grades of Private to Colonel at Army posts throughout the Continental United States. This tool served the common objective of gathering representative opinion on what constitutes a quality soldier.

We have divided the analysis of data into two major parts. The first consists of an analysis of the researched literature and the second is an analysis of results of the opinion survey. In the former, we have isolated significant policies, theories, practices, predilections, and findings regarding the recruitment of quality soldiers. In doing so, we have identified and discussed the agreements and disagreements between the various sources, highlighting the more significant areas of consensus and controversy.

Our analysis of the opinion survey was computer-assisted, through a

collation of opinions by grade, rank, age and years of service. We then analyzed the data to determine prevalent opinions on what constitutes a quality enlisted soldier. Finally, we compared data from the research of literature to that from the opinion survey to determine their correlation. We have combined the results to establish a composite of the quality enlisted soldier.

Delimitations

This study is concerned with the Army only; the focus is on quality of non-prior service enlisted accessions. We have intentionally avoided issues regarding volunteer force vs. conscription and women in the Army.

CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

Scope

This survey was accomplished through the research and analysis of available literature dealing with the quality of today's enlisted soldier. It would be impossible to attain total comprehensiveness in this effort; however, the literature surveyed encompassed the wide spectrum of current thoughts represented in both government and private sector publications. These included Department of Defense and Department of the Army studies, scholarly journals and books, military journals, commercial periodicals, newspaper articles, published interviews, and research papers previously accomplished at the US Army War College.

It is also important to note at the outset that, despite the delimitations cited in the introductory chapter, issues concerning conscription, racial/ethnic content, socio-economic representation and the socialization process have intruded upon the central theme of this research. This is due, if for no other reason, to the fact that virtually all of the serious writings devoted recently to soldier quality have been accomplished to some extent in the context of these tangential issues.

The Quality Controversy

"The soldiers in our active units today are among the best with whom I have served in 36 years of commissioned service." GEN Bernard Rogers, 1979.¹

". . . 20% to 30% of recruits are unable to read at even the fifth RGL (Reading Group Level)." The Beard Report, 1978.²

More importantly, the quality of those serving on active duty, as measured by the education levels of active duty personnel and the average test scores of new recruits, has not declined as popularly believed but has markedly and steadily improved since the end of the draft. Department of Defense Study, 1978.³

Nine out of 10 soldiers assigned to operate and maintain nuclear weapons had flunked tests of their basic military skills More than 80 percent of the Army's officers complained about the low quality of their troops. Jack Anderson, 1981.⁴

The comments above are illustrative of the continuing debate between critics and defenders of the quality of the soldier in today's Army. The topic is an emotional one and fraught with implications for both the effectiveness and the morale of the Service at a time when the national defense is a major concern both at home and abroad. Moreover, even stripped of emotion, the issue of the quality of the soldier is at least as old as the Army itself. Despite the time and energies devoted to study of this question, a firm definition of quality has eluded most researchers and for every espoused theory, another exists with a countering and persuasive argument. Quality itself is a qualitative descriptor and resists quantification in an age when quantifiable data is required for everything from computer-assisted systems design to budget justifications. While the ultimate purpose of this study is to isolate a working definition of quality, this chapter itself will be restricted to a straight-forward presentation of both sides of the issue.

The following survey is presented within the framework of the hypotheses that quality is a product of both individual characteristics and environmental influences. As a further working hypothesis, the study group viewed quality as a reflection of a soldier's ability and willingness to perform his assigned duties.

Quality as a Function of Individual Characteristics

Three primary characteristics will be addressed in this section of the survey: Intelligence, Motivation (Attitude), and Self-discipline.

Intelligence. The Army uses two major yardsticks to measure the intelligence of new enlistees. These are possession of a high school diploma (educational achievement) and mental test scores. These scores are derived from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Tests (ASVAB). A portion of the ASVAB scores are then converted to a standardized test score called the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Based on AFQT percentile scores, enlistees are classified into one of five mental categories with Category I being the highest. Category V scores disqualify individuals from military enlistment. In addition to intelligence, basic quality of the new soldier is determined upon the basis of these measurements.⁵

In a major study released in December 1978, the Department of Defense (DOD) defended the quality of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) on the grounds of improvements in both AFQT scores and in the numbers of High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG) entering the Army. With regard to educational levels, the study states that "possession of a high school diploma is the best single measure of a person's potential for adapting to life in the military."⁶ Further that "High school graduates are more likely to complete their terms of service than are their contemporaries

who have not received a high school diploma."⁷ Attainment of a high school diploma is cited by most writers and researchers as an indicator of quality and military service potential. In the 1980-81 Army Green Book, LTG Robert G. Yerks, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), Department of the Army (DA), wrote that the Army needs "to increase our high school graduate accessions."⁸ LTG Yerks also notes that "non-high school graduates leave the Army before completing their first term of service at about twice the rate of high school graduates."⁹ He goes on to say that, while many non-graduates do complete their service and are good soldiers, the requirement for high school graduates is wise, economical, and apparent. GEN Donn A. Starry, then Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), writing in the same publication, states that the "value of the diploma is that it signifies achievement."¹⁰ Charles C. Moskos, Jr., prominent in research on the composition of the AVF, has consistently cited attainment of a high school diploma as a hallmark of quality.

The striking finding is that high school graduates are twice as likely as high school dropouts to complete their enlistments. Most revealing, this finding changes little when mental aptitude is held constant. Analyses of enlisted evaluation reports show the same pattern - high school graduates significantly outperform high school dropouts; higher mental levels do better than lower mental levels, but education is a much better predictor than measures of mental aptitude. Studies of unauthorized absences and desertions also show that such behavior is most likely to occur among those who have the least education The evidence is clear, furthermore, that on measures of enlisted productivity, higher educated service members do better not only in high-skill jobs, but in low-skill jobs as well More to the point, careful studies of combat soldiers in World War II and the Korean War showed that, in the aggregate, soldiers with higher education were rated as better fighters by peers and immediate supervisors.¹¹

Both Moskos and Morris Janowitz sum up these thoughts in a study jointly authored in 1979:

At the enlisted level, educational qualifications have emerged as the best predictor of military performance. The high school diploma has become the hallmark of the desired recruit, though it is not a guarantee of required literacy. A high school diploma reflects not only school skills, but, more importantly, personal consistency and effort to achieve a particular goal.¹²

Because of the consensus of thought, represented above, and the fact that the Army has long concentrated its recruiting programs on the enlistment of high school graduates, what are the criticisms of soldier quality based on educational levels? Critics of today's soldier most often cite three factors: quantity (percentage of enlistments), quality of education, and lack of college level education.

Detractors of Army quality based on the number of high school diploma accessions point to the fact that, despite the emphasis, the Army has failed to recruit its goal of HSDG enlistments for most of the AVF era (the target is 68% of enlistments, a goal the Army reached in Fiscal Year 1981).¹³ This argument is best summed up by Moskos who writes,

It is indisputable that the educational levels of male enlistees in the all-volunteer Army are far lower than either the equivalent civilian population or the Army entrants of 1964, the last year before the war in Vietnam. Since the end of the draft, an average of over 40 percent of Non-Prior Service (NPS) males have not had a high school diploma compared with 25.5 percent non-graduates among 19 year-old males in the general population and 28.7 percent of draftees and 39.9 percent of volunteers in 1964. The contrast between the educational levels of the all-volunteer Army and the peacetime-draft Army is even greater when considered in light of the proportional increase in male high school graduates from 66 percent of males aged 18 to 24 years in 1965 to 76 percent in 1977. Thus while the national trend has been towards a higher percentage of high school graduates, the percentage of graduates among army enlistees has been dropping.¹⁴

Moskos further cites studies showing "that among high school graduates who do enter the military, the tendency is to come from the lower levels of their graduating class, especially for those entering the Army."¹⁵ The Army, in effect, is recruiting at the margins. The US Census for

1980, released on 19 April 1982, appears to substantiate the trend cited by Moskos. A 14 percent increase in high school graduates over age 25 was reported by the Census, which further noted that this was the first year in which every state had surpassed the 50% mark in this category.¹⁶

Critics of the quality of education echo a complaint voiced by many today in America. Foremost among these critics as they look at the impact of educational level on military quality have been Bernard Rimland and Gerald Larson. In their 1981 study, they claim that "the use of measures of high school education as an index of quality no longer can be considered defensible." As of 1979, all but four states were planning to require students to pass minimum competency examinations for high school graduation. Such requirements were first adopted, by two states, as recently as 1975. It has become clear that the granting of a high school diploma has become a pro forma gesture in many schools and no longer indicates that the graduate can necessarily read or calculate at the twelfth grade level. Neither the diploma nor good grades can be relied on as implying competence and motivation. A 1978 study of nearly 200,000 entering college students showed a great deal of grade inflation. Professor Alexander Astin of UCLA, quoted by Walsh, remarked: "When these grades are considered in the light of declining scores on college admission tests, it seems clear that these schools' grading standards have been steadily declining since the late 1960's."¹⁷ Rimland and Larson further examine the decline of quality in civilian youth, addressing downward trends in SAT scores, lowered IQ scores, teaching methods, and even reduced standards of teacher performance. They conclude that,

High School graduation has been considered an index of attitude and motivation, as well as a reasonable academic measure.

Obviously, the average high school graduate must still be considered more competent and more favorably motivated than the non-graduate. High school graduation today, however, means less than it did five or ten years ago. It is therefore not possible to measure changes in quality as a function of percentage of high school graduates.¹⁸

Their message clearly is that there is a real decline in the quality of today's enlistee and that it is only to be expected, given the overall decline within the general youth population from which the enlistees are recruited. The criticisms of enlistee reading ability, prominent in the quality debate, are viewed from a much more informed perspective when placed in the context of the Rimland-Larson study. Educational problems in the Army must be seen as a reflection of US society at large. As LTG Yerks put it: "Army tests can identify the problem, not solve it."¹⁹ The prospects for quality in the Army, then, are even more alarming in view of the DOD statement that,

While high school education has been a good indicator of a person's ability to adapt to military life, it is not as good an indicator for success in military training schools as is reading ability.²⁰

Critical comment on the lack of enlistees with at least some college education has come primarily from Moskos in his various studies and papers. He views this not so much as an educational shortcoming as it is a reflection of a lack of balance which detracts from the socio-economic leavening of the Army. Still, there is an educational impact that is created by this deficiency and it can be sharply drawn from two examples given by Moskos. "In 1964 over 40,000 persons with some college education entered the Army's enlisted ranks; in 1978 the figure was less than 5,000."²¹

Where 17.2 percent of the draftees and 13.9 percent of the enlistees in 1964 had some college, the corresponding figures in the All-Volunteer Army have been around 5 percent. It is startling to learn that in 1980 among first-term enlisted personnel in the entire US Army there were only 276 college graduates (out of

339,678) members) and only ²⁵ college graduates in all the combat arms (out of 100,860 men).²²

The DOD response to concern about college educated enlistees was given in its 1978 Report, America's Volunteers:

The military certainly can benefit from these more educated people, but few enlisted military positions require college training. In many cases, a college educated recruit would probably consider himself to be overqualified for the tasks assigned.²³

Perhaps the most controversial measurement of quality used by the Army has been the mental category derived from the AFQT. This controversy has extended to the ASVAB upon which the AFQT is based. The arguments have received adequate illumination in the press and will only be highlighted here to insure full representation of views. A detailed account of the AFQT can be found in a DA study dated 30 July 1980, and entitled An Examination of the Use of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as a Screen and a Measure of Quality.²⁴

Until 1980, DOD statistics reflected an upward trend in the mental quality of the AVF as measured by written test scores. While DOD admitted a drop in the number of Category I and II enlistees, it also pointed out that average quality had improved due to a higher force content of Category I, II, and III accessions. Further acknowledging that the Army had a distribution problem (higher percentage of Category IIIB enlistees - 45%), the DOD position was still one of optimism regarding the quality of the force.²⁵

This view was seriously challenged, however, in February, 1980, when:

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics stated during Congressional testimony that the current norms of the ASVAB, particularly the AFQT, were seriously underestimating the number of recruits in Category IV.²⁶

Moskos highlighted this problem later that same year when he reported that,

It has been a stock argument among defenders of the AVF that the mental quality of recruits, as measured by aptitude tests, has improved over that of the draft era. There was always a certain amount of misdirection in this argument. No one could deny that the proportion of recruits in the top mental categories of I and II had declined, from 42 percent in 1964 to 27 percent in 1979. But this was countered by the purported drop in those scoring in mental category IV, the lowest from which the military is allowed to recruit. In testimony given in the House in early 1980, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower reported that the aptitude tests may have been 'mismnormed' and that Category IV recruits may be increasing rather than decreasing.²⁷

The impact on Army recruiting was readily apparent given the disproportionate share of Category IIIB ("the margins") enlistees entering this service.

Several investigations of this purported problem were undertaken (by the Army Research Institute and the Center for Naval Analyses, among others) with the result being, as reported by Rimland and Larson in the Fall of 1981, that the studies,

Have established beyond doubt that the ASVAB was mismnormed and that this mismnorming led to gross overestimates of personnel quality. New norms, based on large-scale experimental testing of applicants in June and July of 1979 have now been implemented. Under the then current norms, 74.3% of the over 100,000 applicants tested in 1979 had been classified in Mental Categories I, II or III. Under the corrected norms, however, which tie the scores back to a mobilization population tested in World War II, only 54.9% of the applicants would have fallen into the I, II, or III categories. Thus, since almost 20% of the population classified as Category IIIs or higher were actually Category IVs or Vs, the actual number of IVs and Vs was almost double the original estimate. As compared to World War II personnel, almost half of the Army's recruits in the late 1970s fell below the thirtieth percentile in mental ability. Fiscal Year 1980 test scores show further declines. The overall percentage of Category IVs entering the Services rose to 33 in 1980 from 30 in 1979, and the percentage of Category IVs in the Army rose to 52 There are now reports that recruits mistakenly enlisted during the last four years due to test mismnorming have performed at a level significantly below that of other recruits.²⁸

In a masterpiece of understatement, these two researchers also say that

"over-evaluation of high school graduation and mental levels probably accounts for much of the recent controversy regarding the quality decline within the armed services."²⁹ Dissatisfaction with the mental aptitude measurement device has also been increasingly voiced from within the Army. The authors of the 1980 DA study cited earlier concluded that,

It does not require testing expertise to recognize that the conditions of military service today differ radically from those for which the AFQT was developed. Volunteers choose not only whether they will serve but also the military specialties in which they serve. Moreover, large segments of the population choose not to serve under present circumstances. Motivation is the key criterion: speed in learning (with reference to training) has been reduced to being a desirable factor. To continue to use a test designed to operate in a different environment is a matter which responsible testing experts would question, and which has led many to conclude that the AFQT has outlived its usefulness.³⁰

More succinctly, GEN Starry has stated that there is "no significant correlation between ASVAB scores and how well soldiers do in training."³¹ More eloquently from GEN Starry:

If our Army is to be allowed but a few soldiers, then they must be good ones. And for the sake of the nation, their goodness must be measured not in terms of ambiguous scores, norms, and averages, but, rather, in terms of their motivation, their values.³²

However, early returns on studies recently initiated indicate that there is a positive correlation between AFQT entrance scores and SQT scores which would negate GEN Starry's argument at least in a statistical sense.

Motivation. The foregoing paragraph provides a ready-made transition to motivation and other factors from the discussion of intelligence as a measurement of quality. The discussion of intelligence has been, of necessity, the most detailed (and perhaps cumbersome) section of this survey due simply to the fact that the emphasis of the Army has been on

this index of quality and, therefore, it has been the primary target for critics of soldier quality. This is not the case with motivational and other factors. For one thing, they resist realistic quantification and are difficult to track or predict. More pragmatically, perhaps, these factors have only recently been suggested by the military as replacement indices for intelligence measurements and the critics and researchers have possibly not caught up. In any event, the literature extant on these factors is considerably reduced and often is found within the same studies that have mental quality measurement as their focus. Despite this, there are a number of areas that lend themselves to the study of motivation - the willing aspect of our willing and able formula for quality.

One area reflecting motivation, and one that can be measured fairly precisely, is that concerning attrition, or failure to complete the first term of enlistment. Due to the impact attrition has had on the Army's ability to maintain authorized strength levels and the attendant costs of replacing attrition losses, this factor has received almost as much publicity as mental categories. As an index, it has been seized upon by many researchers as evidence that existing service measurements of enlistee quality are invalid. Moskos, in 1980, pointed out that one of the major premises behind conversion to an all-volunteer force was,

That, with longer term enlistments, there would be less personnel turnover than in a military system heavily dependent upon draftees and draft-motivated volunteers. This has turned out not to be the case. Since 1973, over 600,000 young people have been prematurely discharged from the military for reasons of indiscipline, personality disorders, job inaptitude, and the like.³³

This problem had been acknowledged in the 1978 DOD study, America's Volunteers which stated that "attrition is obviously a serious problem warranting close attention."³⁴ In the Army, specifically, the study

notes that "the three-year attrition rate for people who enlisted in FY 1971 was 26% while the FY 1974 entry group had a rate of 38%."³⁵ By 1976, this figure had increased to 48%.³⁶ Rimland and Larson point out that "attrition trends are difficult to determine because of policy changes regarding discharges from the military."³⁷ Moskos, in several papers; and the DOD study draw a different conclusion, however, pointing to statistics (previously cited in this survey) showing that attainment of a high school diploma is a sign not only of educational achievement but of the motivational power required to stay in the Army. The diploma, therefore, is raised again as a valid hallmark of quality. A dissenting vote is cast by Dr.(COL) Edward Jeffer, an Army psychiatrist, who believes that motivation comes from a feeling of self-worth and a sense of identify with the Army. Jeffer goes on to say that the continued debate about low educational levels is watched and heard by the soldier who then feels left out if he does not have a diploma. This results in a negative motivation in turn reflected in attrition.³⁸ In any event, the Army has reported a reversal in the high attrition trend with the conclusion that attainment of higher HSDG content has contributed to this favorable development. Another logical conclusion tied closely to this is that more middle class youth are apparently being enticed into the military because of the declining economy and high costs of college. This middle class youth has a value system more competitive with the military's. This will be discussed in more detail later.

Another motivational factor examined in the search for the cause of declining quality is pay and benefits. Greatly increased pay for lower ranking enlisted personnel was intended to induce high quality, college-

bound persons to join the military. Moskos claims this has been "a double-edged sword," citing youth surveys showing

that pay motivates less-qualified youth (for example, high school dropouts and graduates with poor grades) to join the armed services, but has a negligible effect on college-bound youth. Any policy based on increases in pay to the lower enlisted will only aggravate the present trend to recruit at the margin.³⁹

Moskos further suggests that a far more serious impact on motivating quality enlistments has been caused by,

The elimination of the GI Bill in 1976 and concurrent expansion of federal assistance to college students. Congress has created a system of educational benefits which offers more to those who do not serve their country than to those who do.⁴⁰

The 1978 DOD study acknowledges that the termination of the GI Bill was a significant benefit loss, however, the study concludes that new educational benefit programs such as the Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP) were designed to offset this loss.⁴¹ The implementation of VEAP, Ultra-VEAP, and other, more recent, incentive programs has not been in effect long enough to provide reliable data concerning the attraction these programs have exercised on enlistee motivation. The Moskos view, however, appears substantiated in a study of pre-enlistment expectations and perceptions conducted by Rupert Chisholm, Donald Gauntner, and Robert Munzenrider, and reported on in the Spring 1980 issue of the Journal of Political and Military Sociology. The authors surveyed over 600 first-term enlistees at three Army installations in 1976 on the reasons they had enlisted. Their findings revealed that the greatest single factor affecting the decision to enlist was the opportunity for GI Bill benefits. 38.1% of the respondents cited this factor as being the most important. Only 5.4% said it was not important. Conversely, only 13.2% reported that job/pay was the most important factor while 46.6% said this was not important in their enlistment decision.⁴² It is

interesting to note that in his thorough study of the British volunteer experience and recruiting problems, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins mentions educational incentives only insofar as they pertained to recruiting officer candidates already in college. At no other time is education level even mentioned, nor, for that matter, is quality even addressed per se. The term "qualified" is used in a general term, but the overall attribute ascribed to good, qualified soldiers is "motivated" (unfortunately not further defined).⁴³ High pay is cited as the primary incentive for enlistment - apparently the battalion or regimental sergeant major insures the remaining motivation is maintained.

The other major issue concerning motivational quality is composed of the arguments about military enlistment as a desire to be a part of a service organization versus the Army as an occupation - self-serving motives versus more idealistic, patriotic motives. Discussion of the merits of these arguments more appropriately should be conducted in the context of values as environmental influences on quality. They will be so addressed in this survey, however, the underlying causes of this issue highlight a source of discontent that impacts considerably on soldier motivation and perceptions as to his quality. Moskos calls it "postentry disillusionment."⁴⁴ He writes that it,

Has no real parallel in the peacetime draft Army . . . resulting from expectations as to what the military would offer. The peacetime draftee never held high expectations as to what he would encounter and therefore was not unpleasantly surprised: indeed, he might often - at least in hindsight - out of necessity, to be sure - on the instrumental aspects of military service, that is, what can the Army do for the recruit in the way of skill-training transferable to civilian jobs. Because the new volunteer often sees the military as a last alternative to limited chances in civilian life, he is understandably irate when his expectations are not met Postentry disillusionment in the all-volunteer Army underlies many morale and disciplinary problems; it speaks directly to the excessive attrition rate. For once a soldier has decided

he wants out, he will not be particular as to the kind of discharge that will accomplish the purpose Although the all-volunteer concept shies away from the irreconcilable dilemma is that many Army assignments - mostly, but not exclusively in the combat arms - do not and cannot have transferability to civilian jobs.⁴⁵

Discipline. This characteristic, despite an abundance of statistics, charts, and conclusions drawn therefrom defies definition almost as much as quality itself. Data bases used in compiling statistics are inconsistent, often incompatible, and reflect, at best, only those incidents that require some legal action whether involving courtmartial or nonjudicial punishment. Regardless of the validity of this data, indiscipline in the Army is often cited by the quality critics as reaching epidemic proportions. The following comments represent the variety of opinions expressed in current literature.

In his article, LTG Yerks cited decreases in indiscipline in the Army since 1974 despite estimates that five percent of soldiers, E1-E5, were dependent on drugs and another 11% dependent on alcohol.⁴⁶ Rimland and Lason, however, cite a survey of 15,000 military personnel indicating that substance abuse is a widespread problem.

For example, 19% of the total E1-E5 population . . . reported having been on drugs while working within the preceding 12 months, half the drug users being 'high' 40 or more days. Of the total, 27% . . . reported work impairment due to alcohol in the preceding 12 months.⁴⁷

In March, 1977 testimony before a Senate sub-committee, William R. King reported a 35% increase in the rate of nonjudicial punishment in the armed forces over the Vietnam era levels.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the DOD study of 1978, while acknowledging large increases in the mid-1970's, reported a downward trend almost to pre-Vietnam levels. Additionally the Army had a significant decrease in courtmartial over that era.⁴⁹ It should be noted however that none of the studies surveyed had

attempted to draw any conclusions on reported indiscipline rates in the light of the several administrative discharge programs available more recently to commanders.

The survey of literature would generally support the validity of criticism leveled at the state of discipline in the mid-1970s. Similarly, it reflects that the Army has made great strides since then in coming to grips with, and solving, the problem. Still, the perception persists of indiscipline in the service and it is damaging to the Army. Perhaps it is only a reflection of what Dr. Moskos found in a recent visit to Army units in Germany:

A level of raucousness, if not rowdiness, does exist which exceeds the decibel count and temper of the pre-Vietnam Army. Not that the drafted, peacetime Army was a sanctuary of decorum, but the tone of barracks life is no longer modulated by conventional middle class standards as it was a decade or so ago.⁵⁰

Quality as a Function of Environmental Influences and/or the Socialization Process

This portion of the survey of literature is devoted to several factors that the study group has termed environmental influences and/or, the socialization process. For the most part, they resist measurement, but they have the potential, in a realistic manner, for affecting organizational or unit quality just as much, or more so, than individual characteristics. Some theorists would argue that these influences are even more important and that the Army must find ways to either pre-determine the existence of favorable influences in enlistees or to provide these influences or resocialization process once the enlistee is in the Service. Because of the wide variety of these influences (any one of which could be the subject of a separate study), the following paragraphs are intended to identify representative themes rather than to

present a comprehensive recapitulation of the studies from which they are derived.

Size of the Army. This factor has been noted by at least two persons writing about quality. Citing the problems of the Army highlighted in the past by recruiting shortfalls and high attrition, GEN Starry comments on a lack of resiliency, or inability to adjust, "due to a smaller Army doing more with less rather than to a fall in quality."⁵¹ Dr. Moskos further comments on this aspect, saying,

That too much is being asked for (and still being given) in too little time . . . it may be that the all-volunteer Army is causing an excessive workload in cutting back its administrative and support services. For conscientious soldiers at all ranks, hours are appallingly long.⁵²

The Technology Explosion. The feeling that technological advances in equipment have outstripped soldier ability to master them has been expressed from several quarters. Rimland and Larson state that,

Regardless of whether or not there has been a recent decline in quality, there is little doubt that the armed forces of the future will require personnel who are at least as sophisticated and trainable as the personnel of today. Weapons systems, vehicles, communications systems, and virtually all other military equipment are becoming more complicated and demanding, and there is reason to believe that the performance gap between high - and low-ability personnel may increase along with this rise in occupational difficulty. The Beard Report claims that 7 out of 10 Army jobs require technical training In short, we seem to be reaching a point at which the technological superiority enjoyed by our Armed forces in the past may be vitiated by an inability on the part of military personnel to implement new scientific advances Fialka reporting findings based on a study of the Army Skill Qualification Tests, stated that, of samples of 1574 artillery crewmen, 385 nuclear weapons maintenance specialists and 371 tank turret and artillery repairmen, only 14%, 10%, and 2%, respectively passed. Bonner reports that the deficits in Skill Qualification Test performance appear to result from a failure to retain the material rather than to deficient training practices. These trends are particularly disturbing since operator skill may be of equal or greater importance than quality of weapons in determining the outcome of battles.⁵³

The Beard report observes: "There is a deep concern and anxiety on the

part of commanders and NCOs that the gulf between weapons technology and individual potential is growing wider at an alarming rate.⁵⁴ While acknowledging statistical declines in educational and mental levels of the soldier, Peter D. Weddle believes the problem is not purely one of soldier quality. He says:

Declining aptitudes, skill shortages, flagging motivation and inadequate maintenance have all been described at great length in Congressional hearings, countless studies and the public media. The testimony is indeed pointed. Very sophisticated helicopters cannot fly, extremely lethal weapons are inoperative and remarkably fine-tuned radios are increasingly on the blink and take longer to fix. The United States has the most advanced weaponry in the world but cannot find the soldiers, at least the right soldiers, to make it all work.

The result has been a growing perception that the American soldier is inadequate to his mission, that, but for the serviceman or servicewoman, the technological genius of the country would more than adequately maintain the national security. This perception is inaccurate. The Army does have a problem with equipment readiness, but the cause of that problem is not the soldier. Rather, the 'fault' lies in the way the military services, including the Army, develop and acquire new systems.

Modern weapon systems are a complex amalgamation of hardware, software, and human operators and maintainers. Though the current state of the art now makes it possible, technology has not been designed into new systems so that soldiers and machines are efficiently and effectively integrated into a capable total system. Rather than using technology to accommodate or enhance the soldier's contribution to the system's mission readiness, the system design process has myopically focused on engineering improvements to hardware and software performance. Thus, as Generals George S. Blanchard and Walter T. Kerwin pointed out in a recent study for the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency, there is a disconnect, a mismatch, at the soldier-machine interface.⁵⁵

This problem of coping with growing technological complexity is not unique to the US Army however. The following was written by Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Ogarkov, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, in a recent edition of Kommunist, a party journal:

The Army and Navy's high level of technical equipment also makes considerable demands on the quality of training of conscripts. It is simply a difficult task today to find an

appropriate place in units or on ships for a person of limited competence. Only people with an adequate general education and technical training and also - taking into consideration the multinational composition of the Soviet Armed Forces - those who have a good knowledge of Russian, are capable of handling the complex and, for the most part, crew-operated modern combat equipment and arms.⁵⁶

Military Training and Leadership. Marshal Ogarkov finds the answer to recruit quality to lie in the training they receive.⁵⁷ It appears, from writings and contemporary Army efforts that, this is also the intuitive answer, at least, that many service leaders develop in confronting the quality issue. It seems an article of military faith that good training conducted by good, dedicated leaders will overcome mental inaptitude, inspire greater motivation, and prevent incidents of indiscipline. Indeed, historical examples would tend to substantiate this view. GEN Starry supports this viewpoint, observing that training is key to adaptation to military service today, and that this was also the case in World War II when armored forces were faced with increases in technological sophistication.⁵⁸ Pointing out shortened basic training time available as well as a reduced training cadre, GEN Starry further states that "the problem is not the quality of the soldiers, but our unwillingness and inability to pay the price to insure they are given enough time and resources to learn."⁵⁹ From closer to the grass roots, the following comments were made in an Army War College paper by LTC Richard B. Cole and are representative of the opinion of many of his contemporaries and of this philosophy:

Today's soldier,

Will respond to leadership and group norms - if they are good he will be a motivated and responsive team player He likes to work hard doing something worthwhile. If given excess idle time, he will become an 'indiscipline' statistic! If given jobs that he perceives as not being worthwhile, he will become a 'Beetle Bailey' He will learn and accept and profit from good training given by competent leadership

He is a reflection of his leaders, he can be a fine soldier or a dud. If his leaders give a damn, so will he and he will produce; if they do not, he will be either non-productive or counter-productive We have the responsibility to quit wringing our hands over soldier quality, and affect the Army system so the soldier can be the quality soldier we want and he wants to be. He will be if we do our part.⁶⁰

Finally, in response to Congressional concern as to whether today's soldier could do his job, the GAO investigated and published a report to Congress in March 1981. The GAO findings are basically that too many cannot perform their duties and that the underlying cause is poor training. Four primary factors are cited:

1. Soldiers are not trained to MOS Skill Level I in Advanced Individual Training.
2. Units do not conduct all required training.
3. Soldiers Manuals, SQT scores, and job books are not used.
4. Leaders are marginally qualified to train.⁶¹

Race. Growing Army content of Blacks and other minority groups is another factor cited by several researchers investigating soldier quality. Whether raised out of prejudice or genuine concern for a disproportionate share of casualties in wartime, this has become almost a "non-issue" in more recent literature. Robert Lieder summarizes this fact by saying that "the threatened four-alarm blaze of an all-black military turned out to be an ashtray fire."⁶² Despite criticism early in the AVF era, the result of increased black representation appears to have had the opposite effect from that originally feared. Moskos states that it,

Is a well-recognized fact that the educational levels of blacks in America have trailed behind that of whites. But, the intersect of race and education is quite different among entrants in the all-volunteer Army. Since the end of the draft, the proportion of NPS (non-prior service) black males with a high school diploma has been 65 percent compared with 54 percent for whites. In point of fact, today's Army enlisted

ranks is the only major arena in American society where black educational levels surpass those of whites and by a significant degree. Whereas the black soldier seems fairly representative of the black community in terms of education and social background, white entrants of recent years are coming from the least educated sectors of the white community.⁶³

Moskos further quotes an assessment given him by a longtime German employee of the Army: "In the volunteer Army, you are recruiting the best of the blacks and the worst of the whites."⁶⁴ This is surely an exaggeration of fact, but it points out growing concern, from a racial standpoint, not for the blacks in the Army, but for the representativeness of the whites.

Class Representation. This heading could just have easily been "Socioeconomic" and been just as accurate. The fact of the matter is, however, as Moskos strongly hints above, the underrepresentation of the white middle class is viewed by some as a serious detractor from overall force quality. Whether real or perceived, this issue is emotional and begs resolution through honest research and not through statistical tours d' force seemingly slanted to one side or another. If the problem is perceptual, then as Seth Cropsey writing in Harpers suggests, the Army's image needs to be improved. Cropsey states that this can best be accomplished by increased middle class representation.⁶⁵ Charles Moskos feels the problem is more substantive. He states:

What may be happening in the all-volunteer Army, I suggest is something like the following. Whereas the black soldier is fairly representative of the black community in terms of education and social background, white entrants of recent years are coming from the least-educated sectors of the white community. My stays with Army line units also leave the distinct impression that many of our young enlisted white soldiers are coming from non-metropolitan areas. I am even more impressed by what I do not find in line units - urban and suburban white soldiers of middle class origins. In other words, the all-volunteer Army is attracting not only a disproportionate number of minorities, but also an unrepresentative segment of white youth, who, if anything, are even more uncharacteristic of the broader social mix than are our minority soldiers.⁶⁶

In another article, Moskos says further that,

There is a clear relationship between socio-educational background and soldierly performance By no means does being middle class make one braver or more able: there are many outstanding soldiers in the all-volunteer Army who have modest educational attainments. But our concern must also be with the chemistry of unit cohesion which requires an optimum blend of talents and backgrounds. The distinctive quality of the enlisted experience starting with World War II was the mixing of the social classes and, starting with the Korean War, the mixing of the races. This gave less-advantaged youth an opportunity to test themselves, often successfully, against more privileged youth. This state of affairs began to diminish during the Vietnam War when the college educated avoided service: it has all but disappeared in the all-volunteer Army.⁶⁷

DOD has been heard clearly coming down on the other side of the argument. In the 1978 study, DOD claims even social distribution based on research into both geographical and economic backgrounds of enlistees in the AVF.⁶⁸ Most recently, in January 1982, Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L), wrote of the representation issue:

The question is raised in two ways — practical and ethical. I, for one, reject the "practical" concern based on the notion that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from certain socioeconomic backgrounds or of some races or from particular regions of the country will be less willing or able than their comrades in arms to defend America or American interests in any or certain war scenarios. This argument is specious at best, bigoted at worst. Based on our experience in past wars and based on what I know firsthand of those in uniform today, I personally see no grounds for concern along these lines.

The ethical concern is, in theory, more well-founded. The burden of defending an entire society should not fall disproportionately on any one group or segment of that society. I say that knowing full well that virtually no army in history has been fully representative of the society it defends.

We have conducted numerous surveys and studies of the representativeness of the force. The truth belies the popular myth. In terms of socioeconomic status, the very highest and the very lowest brackets are underrepresented in the enlisted force, but otherwise it is quite representative. Geographically, we are getting a proportionate share of recruits from all regions and all states. Our most recent major study

compared 18-21 year-old military personnel with their contemporaries in the civilian workforce. The findings will be surprising to many. Among males:

- the percentage of high school graduates is about the same,
- the educational and occupational distributions of their parents are virtually the same,
- their marital status distribution is the same,
- their health profiles reveal no differences, and
- their mental abilities are very similar.

For women, the backgrounds and abilities of young service-members are higher than those of their civilian counterparts.

In terms of race, the minority composition of the armed forces began to grow during the Vietnam War, and it has increased more rapidly under the AVF. It is important to note two facts: first, that since 1973 all recruits were volunteers, not draftees, and, second, higher percentages of black youth meet the standards for enlistment now than before. Improved educational opportunities for blacks have, I think, yielded higher aptitude scores for blacks. During this same period, however, unemployment rates for black youth have become very high. In my opinion, the military offers blacks and other minorities better opportunities for training and advancement than does much of the civilian sector. It is no surprise, therefore, that large numbers of blacks are joining the service and making a career of it.

At the same time, the equity issue persists: no group should have to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of defending, or, in the event of war, a disproportionate share of the casualties. I do not believe we are at the former stage yet, nor do I foresee it in the future. As for the latter, a major war would in all likelihood stimulate a draft, and racial balance among military personnel, including casualties, would be quickly restored.⁶⁹

Since class affiliation is a major determinant of value systems because of the socialization process, this leads to the dilemma of recruiting individuals whose value systems more closely mesh with that of the military especially in attitudes, motivation, and self-discipline. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

The Socialization Process

Military leaders and behavioral theorists recognize the importance of the individual's socialization process and the values internalized from that process as an environmental influence on quality. There is substantial concern regarding whether military enlistees are driven by a desire to be part of a service organization for idealistic or patriotic reasons, or whether they are driven by self-serving motives and seek military service more as an occupation. Equally visible is the concern that over the years society, from which we draw military personnel, has weakened as a promoter of the value system considered requisite to successful military service. There appears to be agreement that, although a person's value system is not as easily measured as some other accepted indicators of quality, the Army must be able to identify the presence or absence of favorable influences in potential enlistees and soldiers already in its ranks.

General Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, addressed the issue in his 1980 White Paper: "The recruiting message must include the profession - as well as the occupation - and the positive image of service."⁷⁰ He further addressed the problem and some of the solutions as he discussed four key values (Loyalty to the unit or Cohesion, Loyalty to the institution, Personal responsibility, and Selfless service) in an article in the 1980-81 Army Green Book:

Over an extended period of time we have succeeded in building some erroneous expectations into the fabric of our institutions which are injurious to many values we hold traditional in military service The deleterious effects of these issues, unless remedied, could carry over and undercut the whole tone and quality of the Army As we work toward a vision of an Army fully attuned to the national needs of this decade, preparing our units for war and seeking to develop our individual talents, we must stay in touch with this set of values key to the fulfillment of our constitutional

obligations. The heart of that task is the support and defense of the Constitution, ergo, the preservation of our national values through preparation for war.⁷¹

Also, General Donn A. Starry, then Commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, focused on the preeminence of values in assessing soldier quality in the 1987-81 Army Green Book. He held that training and soldier performance are influenced by motivation more than any other single factor or combination of factors, and that motivation comes from values, shared hardships and solid leadership. After listing his four cornerstone values (Professional Competence, Commitment, Candor and Courage), General Starry identified military professionalism as the sum of all the values and the real, honest definition of quality. In his words,

No amount of arguing about diplomas, grade points or test scores can describe soldier quality. It is finally the cumulative impact of those four values and the motivation to abide by them in peacetime as in battle It is also true, however, that we have not been entirely successful in instilling these values institutionally. Nor have we convinced either our supporters or our critics that they represent the 'quality' by which they must judge us. But convince them we must; we must reject any attempt to measure our quality on any basis other than the four values for which we exist.⁷²

The military sociologist, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., argues that the American military is moving from an institutional format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation. His distinctions between the value system of institutions and their members versus that of an occupation and its members have some bearing on the question of values as an indication of soldier quality. According to Moskos, an institution's values and norms establish its legitimacy. Its members serve a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of self-sacrifice toward a presumed higher good; they are seen as following a calling, and different and apart from the broader society. On the other hand, an occu-

pation is legitimated by the marketplace, the prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. An occupation elevates self-interest over the interests of the employing organizations.⁷³

Finally, this focus on values as an indication of quality has been viewed from the perspective of an increasing values gap between Army leadership and its junior soldiers. Major Stephen D. Westbrook, in a study of soldiers' attitudes toward the Army and society in general, concluded that the Army is facing yet another major societal-induced threat, that of sociopolitical alienation. Major Westbrook defined alienation as a condition of estrangement or separation whose dimensions include cynicism (a condition of mistrust and lack of confidence), isolation (the values and beliefs held by the individual differ from those held by the rest of society), and meaninglessness (the individual lacks a clear set of values).⁷⁴ Sampling 425 soldiers in grades private (E1) through sergeant (E5), Major Westbrook found junior enlisted soldiers to be evidencing a high level of alienation. Some statistics from his survey follows:

SURVEY QUESTION	AGREE %	UNSURE %
Most people will take advantage of you if given the chance.	86	—
There are few dependable people.	66	11
Most people are not concerned about others.	69	16
Most people cannot be trusted.	51	19
A person generally does not receive fair treatment under the law.	47	19
Luck and who you know matter more in life in getting ahead than merit or hard work.	54	15
A person must do what is best for himself even at the expense of others.	28	17

There are no right or wrong ways to make money, only easy and hard ways.	34	10
Ideas change so fast that there is nothing to depend on.	54	27
There are no rules to live by, everything is relative.	33	22
Most politicians usually do not tell the truth.	58	26
Most high government officials and political leaders cannot be trusted.	41	37
The government is not concerned with people like me.	51	21
Most judges are dishonest.	22	42
Cannot count on officers and senior NCOs to look out for soldiers' interests.	52	20
Senior NCOs and officers are not concerned about me.	37	15
Most officers and NCOs cannot be trusted.	28	23
I am accomplishing nothing as a soldier.	43	19

While the purpose here is not to validate the theory of socio-political alienation, some of the questions it raises regarding soldiers' values and motivation are worthy of recognition. Will a soldier who perceives his social and political system to be corrupt and to be largely unrepresentative of his interests fight to preserve the system? Will the soldier who lacks the requisite sense of identity and shared values properly respond to the normative power over him by the Army? Does the lack of a clear set of values make it more difficult for the soldier to set long-term goals that motivate him toward a high level of proficiency and discipline.⁷⁶

Thus, this focus on values as an indicator of motivation appears key to a true assessment of soldier quality. Its impact carries impli-

cations for both pre-enlistment screening, soldier training, and leadership.

The major findings from the study are as follows:

1. There is a negative correlation between alienation and morale, proficiency and discipline. As alienation increases, job satisfaction, job performance, reliability and discipline correspondingly decrease.

2. The continued enlistment of alienated soldiers will decrease the efficiency of the Army.

Major Westbrook offered social reform as the ultimate solution to the problem, but recognized that it is not likely to happen in the near future and that it is beyond the Army's control. As possible solutions internal to the Army, he suggested the following:

1. Social and political education.
 - a. Program stressing military and unit history.
 - b. Structured education in the traditional ethics and norms of the military profession.
2. Draw more representative group of American population into the Army.

Ecology

Rimland and Larson offer an interesting new hypothesis for the quality decline in American youth and the soldier drawn from this source. They posit that falling educational performance, mental aptitude, and even physical disabilities are the result of pre - and post-natal environmental factors that arose during the 1950s and 1960s. They cite wide-spread use of Hexachlorophane from 1955-1965, birth control pills, nuclear fallout, maternal smoking, bottle as opposed to breast

feeding, increased exposure to lead toxins (especially from automobile exhaust), and the proliferation of junk food as significant factors. They further hypothesize that the solution to declining quality is to attack the ecological causes of the decline.

Summary

This survey has attempted to present a representational sampling of extant thought on soldier quality as reflected in available literature. It has covered a wide variety of themes ranging from mental categories to motivation, from mechanical aptitude to middle class morality and mothers' milk. There are certainly other topics which could have been included but were either overlooked or considered inappropriate (e.g: women in the Army) for the study. The important thing is, however, that this review of literature has illuminated issues and conclusions for comparison with the results of the opinion survey to be discussed in succeeding chapters.

The major conclusion drawn from the literature reviewed is that it substantiates Army recruiting policy, which assigns top priority to obtaining high school graduates and then Category I-IIIa accessions, and it emphasizes education and intelligence as valid measurements of potential military quality. Significantly, more recent articles and studies, while reaffirming the worth of these measurements, have focused on the possession of middle class social values as key indicators of quality readily translatable to a military system based in large part on the same values.

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CHAPTER III

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Purpose

The use of a questionnaire was the primary means of collecting essential data on perceptions of quality. The main purpose of the questionnaire was to provide a convenient sample assessment regarding the perceptions of quality as related to intelligence, discipline, motivation, attitude, and technical competence.

Design

The questionnaire used in the survey is attached as Annex A. It was derived from the basic factors of quality - intelligence, discipline, motivation, attitude and technical competence - and was designed to determine soldiers' perceptions of these factors as determinants of quality. The factor of leadership was intentionally omitted to preclude an automatic answer to the quality question, since many soldiers perceive and are socialized to believe that strong leadership can develop almost all marginal soldiers into acceptable ones. However, there is no quantifiable method of evaluating the impact of leadership nor was leadership the intent of this study. Its omission was not intended to downgrade the importance of leadership.

Questions 1-9 of the questionnaire requested biographical data relating to rank, years of service, current assignment, area of current

assignment, age, education, region in which respondent grew up, and marital status. Questions 10-21 provided a measurement device for soldier's perceptions of the importance of the five cited factors of quality. Questions 22-26 ask the respondent to compare current enlistees with those entering the Army during the period 1977-1980. The intent of these questions was to determine the degree that the current enlistee was perceived as better, the same, or worse regarding the five cited quality factors, than those entering the Army during the period 1977-1980. The rationale for selecting the five cited quality factors was based on the survey of the literature and the current Army standards for determining quality - High School Diploma Graduate and mental category I-III A. Since these later determinants are considered essential for enlistment in the Army, the soldier's perceptions of the five quality factors was considered essential.

Analytical Plan

The questionnaire was designed for computer-assisted analysis which would provide descriptive statistics needed for quantitative assessment of the climate of quality in the Army. It was thought that the analysis would reveal relationships between biographical variables in questions 1-9, and the perceived factors of quality in questions 10-26. A statistical analysis of each biographical question and the responses to questions 10-26 was conducted to include the US Army War College Student responses to the same questions. In this manner, a statistical analysis could be made of each question with each biographical category.

Survey Population

Prior to administration, the questionnaire was pre-tested with

officer groups at the Army War College. These tests verified the design and wording of the survey instrument. The questionnaire was reviewed and approved by the Survey Control Division, MILPERCEN.

The final version of the questionnaire was completed by 1829 officers and enlisted soldiers with two or more years of service. The size of the sample was one of convenience and no attempt was made to obtain a statistical sample representing the Army as a whole. The respondents consisted of students at the Army War College, Command and General Staff College, Infantry School, Soldier Support Center, CONUS TO&E units, Training Centers and Recruiting Command. The survey was administered personally by three US Army War College Students during March and April, 1982 and was conducted in a manner to insure the respondents anonymity.

The sample is intentionally weighted to the O3-O6 officer and E5-E9 enlisted ranks based on the requirement for respondents with adequate time in service to make a valid response to the comparative questions 22-26. Questions 22-26 included the response "No basis for comparison" to compensate for any personnel with insufficient experience to answer the questions. The variety of respondents sampled are not statistically representative of the Army as a whole, but are considered representative of the surveyed groups within the Army.

The sample was relatively well educated by Army standards. A total of 96 percent of the respondents were high school graduates and 60 percent had some college or were college graduates. This is a higher percentage than the Army as a whole and could be the basis for some bias. The number of combat arms and recruiters in the survey sample exceed their respective representation in the Army but is considered representative of these groups within the Army.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The major task of the survey was to determine active duty soldiers' perceptions of quality related to the factors of intelligence, discipline, motivation, attitude, and technical competence. The results of the survey are not to be taken as an actual representation of the entire Army but should provide data for further analysis and study. The discussion of the results will follow the format of a dialogue of questions 10-26 of the questionnaire and responses, with comments relating to specific biographical grouping responses when they differ from the overall survey population. Where appropriate, a detailed analysis will be provided. A summary of the biographical data is at Annex B. The number of responses to each answer on the questionnaire is at Annex C.

- o Which characteristic do you consider more important in a soldier?

The majority of respondents answered either Positive attitude (36.4%) or strong self-motivation (37.9%) for a combined percentage of 74.3%. Informal discussions with respondents confirms the perception that a soldier willing to work and accomplish the mission is the most important characteristic of a soldier. The remaining respondents selected self-discipline (12.5), technical competence

(9.5%), and intelligence (4.4%). The implication of this data is that soldiers who are motivated and have a positive attitude can be trained to the skill level required in the Army. College graduates, respondents over 31 years of age, War College students, C&GSC students, O4-O6 officers and commanders responded positive attitude more frequently while other groups selected self-motivation more frequently than positive attitude. Although all groups selected motivation and attitude as the two most frequent choices, it is significant that the older, more educated, officers and commanders favored attitude over motivation.

- o The biggest problem in today's first term soldier is:

Respondents selected lack of self-discipline (33.6%) closely followed by lack of self-motivation (30.1%) and lack of a positive attitude (22.7%). However, officers responded lack of self-motivation (34.3%) followed by lack of self-discipline (29.1%) and lack of positive attitude (17.2%) as the biggest problem of the first term soldier. Commanders and enlisted personnel E6-E9 responded more frequently that lack of self-discipline was the biggest problem. This perception by the later group may be a result of their requirement to deal with indiscipline on a more frequent basis. The major significance of the responses is that intelligence and technical competence were not chosen by a significant number of respondents as the biggest problem of today's first term soldier.

- o Which of the listed traits is your strongest trait as a soldier?

Self-discipline was selected by 33.4 percent of the survey population and was the highest percentage selection by each biographic group except E8-E9 enlisted personnel. Self-discipline was defined as "orientation to stay out of trouble and follow orders." The second leading response was self-motivation (24%) with 16 percent selecting positive attitude, 12.2 percent technical competence, and 8.6 percent selecting intelligence as their strongest trait. It is significant that 44 percent of Army War College students and 48 percent of C&GSC students surveyed responded that self-discipline was their strongest trait as a soldier. One would anticipate that the future leadership of the Army would select any response other than self-discipline as their strongest trait. However, this data tends to support the Army War College Professionalism Study finding that senior officers tend to want to stay out of trouble rather than leading and supporting subordinates. The selection of self-discipline by age group revealed that the older the respondent, the more frequently self-discipline was selected as the strongest trait. Perhaps this explains the response by Army War College and C&GSC Students.

- o Which of the following types of soldiers would you most prefer to serve with?

Without exception, survey respondents, irrespective of

biographical grouping, selected a well disciplined and motivated soldier regardless of intelligence as the one they most preferred to serve with. Technically proficient soldiers was a distant second most frequent selection by 14 percent of the respondents. High school graduates along with mental category I-III A, the Army's current measures of quality totaled only 3 percent and 9.2 percent respectively.

o Quality in a soldier is mostly a result of:

Early home or neighborhood environment, 62 percent, is considered the major factor affecting quality in the soldier. The impact of basic and advanced individual training was considered a factor of quality by 20.6 percent of the respondents. This perception has relevance for recruiting command in recruiting the for and be further evaluated. Home and neighborhood environment cannot and should not be the sole basis for selection or non-selection but should be a consideration in conjunction with other determinants.

o The Army's biggest problem is recruiting:

Although self-motivated soldiers and soldiers with a positive attitude were the majority selections with 26 percent respectively, the survey data reflected mixed emotion regarding the major problem. Consequently, no conclusion can be drawn from the data other than all factors - soldiers who are smart, self-motivated, disciplined, techni-

cally trainable and have a positive attitude - are recruiting problems of the Army. A combination of self-motivated, disciplined and positive attitude responses totals 70 percent of the survey population which parallels the responses to other questions on quality determinants.

- o The Army's biggest problem is retaining or reenlisting:

The responses to this question clearly parallel the previous recruiting question. The significant difference is technically trainable soldiers replaced disciplined soldiers as the second most frequent response. The implication from this data is that the Army should be retaining self-motivated, technically trainable soldiers with positive attitudes. However, each factor was selected by at least 200 respondents which indicates each factor is perceived as a problem.

- o How intelligent is the average first-term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?

The majority response revealed today's soldier is perceived to be moderately intelligent. The number responding poor intelligence, 15.7 percent, was nearly double those responding highly intelligent, 8.6 percent. Of the Training Center personnel responding, 23 percent indicated that the first-term soldiers were of poor intelligence. However, 40.6 percent of the recruiters responded that the average first-term soldier is of high intelligence. (See Table 1.) The dichotomy is perhaps a result of recruiters

emphasis on high school graduates, Mental Category I-IIIA and the training center personnel not observing any appreciable increase in performance.

TABLE 1

	<u>Highly Intelligent</u>	<u>Moderately Intelligent</u>	<u>Poor Intelligence</u>
Recruiters	40.6	52.5	6.9
Training	5.6	71.2	23.2
War College	6.3	79.5	14.2
C&GSC	4.5	76.1	19.3
Officers	5.7	75.2	19.1
Enlisted	10.0	75.2	14.9
Overall	8.6	74.5	15.7

- o How good is the attitude of the average first-term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?

The majority response was that the average first-term soldier is perceived as having a moderate attitude with more selecting good attitude than poor attitude. The under 20 and 21-25 age group selected moderate and poor attitude and the 26 and older age group selected moderate and good attitude. The respondents without a high school diploma and high school graduates indicated moderate to poor attitude whereas respondents with some college or a college degree chose moderate to good attitude. Commanders and squad leaders/platoon sergeants indicated today's first-

termers has a moderate to good attitude. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this data is that the average first-term soldier is perceived to have adequate willingness to do what is required.

- o How motivated is the average first-term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?

The overall response was moderate motivation, 65 percent, with 21 percent indicating poor motivation and 13 percent indicating high motivation. Recruiters indicated the soldiers being recruited possess moderate to high motivation. This would indicate, as expected, that soldiers lose a degree of motivation after entry on active duty.

- o How disciplined is the average first-term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?

The survey results clearly show that the Army has a perceived discipline problem. The majority, 60 percent, indicated the average soldier was moderately disciplined while 31.4 percent responded that the average soldier was poorly disciplined. It is significant that 28.5 percent of E1-E4s indicated the average soldier was poorly disciplined. This factor is a perception of a soldier's peers and warrants attention by the Army leadership. Informal discussions with commanders and drill sergeants revealed that enlistees expect and want discipline when they enter active duty but in many cases the discipline is

not as strict as the enlistee anticipated.

- o How technically qualified is the average first-term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?

The average soldier in the Army today is perceived to possess only moderate (61.9 percent) to poor (27.1 percent) technical qualification. It is beyond the scope of the survey to determine the reason for this perception, but the data indicates that emphasis is required on improving the technical proficiency of the first-term soldier. The responsibility for training must be borne by the training base or must receive emphasis in the unit. As the Army progresses in force modernization, greater emphasis on technical proficiency must be anticipated. The Beard Report and Rimland and Larson study cited in Chapter 2 substantiate the need for improved technical proficiency of soldiers to cope with the technology advances in weaponry and equipment.

- o How intelligent is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered during 1977-1980?

The overall responses reveal the average soldier is about the same or slightly smarter now than during the period 1977-1980. However, 48 percent of recruiters responded that today's soldier is more intelligent now than in the 1977-1980 period. The number of recruiter responses in this category, 200, may have overly biased the overall

results since there was only a 111 response difference between those stating the current soldier was smarter or not as smart. A definite conclusion cannot be made from the data due to the possible bias and even spread of responses in all categories.

- o How self-motivated is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?

The general perception of survey respondents is that the soldier today has about the same or slightly less self-motivation than those who entered the Army in the 1977-1980 timeframe. Approximately 40 percent of combat arms, combat support and combat service support respondents selected less self-motivation now than in previous years. These categories selected less self-motivation more frequently than the overall survey population or any other category of biographical respondents.

- o How technically competent is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?

The preponderance of respondents indicated today's soldier is about the same in technical competence as those entering in previous years. Slightly more indicated less rather than more technical competence but the difference is not statistically significant. The O5-O6 officers, E7-E9 NCOs, recruiters, over 10 years service, college graduates, and War College student categories indicated today's soldier's technical competence was about the same or

slightly higher than in previous years.

- o How disciplined is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?

The overall response indicated that discipline of today's soldier is slightly worse than in previous years. College graduates, War College students, C&GSC officers, E8-E9, and recruiters stated that the discipline of today's soldier is about the same and in some cases better than those entering in previous years. Although the data is inconclusive, 671 respondents indicated discipline is worse today which is significant, this warrants further study.

- o How is the attitude of the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?

The survey results show the attitudes of today's soldier is not significantly different from those entering in previous years. However, enlisted personnel E6 and below, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, personnel under 30 years of age, high school graduates, and training center personnel had a higher preponderance of selecting the attitude is worse rather than better today compared to soldiers entering the Army during the 1977-1980 period.

Summary of Significant Findings

— The survey clearly substantiates the perception that a quality soldier is one who is self-disciplined, has a positive attitude, and possesses self-motivation.

— Intelligence and technical competence are factors of quality but are perceived as clearly secondary to motivation, attitude and disciplines.

— The survey respondents unanimously selected a well-disciplined and motivated soldier regardless of intelligence as the one with whom they most preferred to serve.

— Early home or neighborhood environment is the perceived major determinant of quality in a soldier with a much lesser degree of influence being demonstrated in basic and advanced individual training.

— Today's soldier is perceived to be about the same in intelligence, motivation, attitude and technical competence, as those who entered the Army during the period 1977-1980.

— The survey revealed that lack of self-discipline was perceived as the biggest problem in today's first term soldier. He was further perceived to be less disciplined now than those entering the Army during the period 1977-1980.

— War College and Command and General Staff College Students selected self-discipline (defined as "orientation to follow orders and stay out of trouble") 44 percent and 48 percent respectively, as their most important individual trait as a soldier.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The Army's current recruiting policy, with high school graduates as the first priority followed closely by emphasis on individuals scoring in AFQT mental categories I-III A, is in effect generally buttressed by the survey results, especially in the priority on high school graduates. Respondents were required to select only one answer they believed to be the most important characteristic (or quality) in a soldier. The selection of only one answer forced an affective (or emotional) response (positive attitude - 36.4%, self-motivation - 37.9%, and self-discipline - 12.5%). However, it is very difficult to separate these three characteristics in a cognitive sense because they are so similar and almost always work in tandem (i.e., an individual who is self-motivated is also self-disciplined and has a positive attitude and vice versa). Taking the three characteristics collectively, which are indicative of the value system needed by the Army, the response was an overwhelming 86.8%. Data collected by the Army as shown in the survey of the literature indicated that high school graduates have much lower attrition and misconduct rates than non-graduates with the logical conclusion that high school graduates with their better conduct and job performance generally have better attitudes, motivation, and discipline than non-graduates.

Intelligence and technical competence are equally difficult to cognitively separate and can also be lumped together since they often operate in tandem. Using this logic, they collectively accounted for 13.9% of the responses and clearly became a low second priority.

In effect, the Army's policy in recruiting high school graduates and the desires of the field are probably in consonance. The selection of I-IIIA mental categories as the Army's second priority is probably not shared as heavily by the respondents to the survey. This conclusion is further reinforced in that the respondents would prefer a well-disciplined and motivated soldier regardless of intelligence with whom to serve. This would indicate that "the field" would be satisfied with mental category IIIBs or IVs as long as the acceptable value system was present.

A past value of the military has been that strong, effective leadership, especially that exerted in basic and advanced individual training, can mold almost any recruit into a disciplined and functional soldier. This value may be changing drastically based on the results of the survey. Respondents overwhelmingly listed by a 3 to 1 majority that the quality of the soldier is based more upon those characteristics he possesses upon joining the Army (influence of early home and neighborhood environment or, in more technical terms, the socialization process) than basic or advanced individual training.

Respondents saw little difference in those individuals recruited in the 1981-1982 timeframe (a period with very high content of high school graduates and mental category I-IIIA) with those recruited in the 1977-1980 timeframe (a period when, because of previous recruiting shortfalls, the "floodgates" were opened for non-graduates and lower

mental categories just to man the force). There are two possible conclusions:

1. There may not be as much difference between the "quality" being recruited now than in the immediate past.

2. More likely, because of the past high attrition rates, those soldiers remaining in the Army from the 1977-80 timeframe compare favorably (in motivation, discipline, and attitude - the traits the respondents believed most important in a quality soldier) to those now being recruited.

Although perceived to be the biggest problem in today's soldier and worse now than in previous years, discipline may be based more upon a normal psychological set than actual degradation. Discipline is often considered more important for those who must deal with soldiers on a day to day basis. In the case of enlisted personnel, discipline usually appears to be tougher or better when they were in the lower ranks and on the receiving end as opposed to later years when they are of higher rank and responsible for maintaining discipline. However, the results of the survey cannot be ignored. If only 8.6 percent of the respondents believe our soldiers to be highly disciplined, with the remaining indicating that our soldiers are only moderately or poorly disciplined, there is a problem (either in perception or reality). In any event, the Army must reinforce and maintain high standards of discipline as a major factor in manning a quality force.

Results of the survey appear to reinforce the findings of the Westbrook Study cited in the survey of the literature. The "field," overwhelmingly indicates that their first priority is the youth with good attitudes, motivation, and self-discipline - one who is not alienated in a sociopolitical sense with its cynicism, distrust, isola-

tion, narcissism, normlessness, and lack of acceptable values compatible with military values. Unfortunately in our society, alienation is tied to those of lower socioeconomic class who have psychologically reacted to their prior treatment and state of life. Conversely, because of better life styles, life chances and overall treatment, lower middle class to a degree, and middle class in the main displays few signs of alienation. The conclusion is clear that the Army needs young men and women whose socialization and internalization of norms have created a set of values which are not only compatible with but also actually reinforce those of the military. In short, the field wants middle class youth as a first priority regardless of mental category.

The study was not designed to measure in any way the level of careerism in the officer corps. However, the response that over 44 percent of the Command and General Staff College and War College respondents listed their strongest trait as a soldier to be self-discipline (defined as the orientation to follow orders and stay out of trouble) may indicate careerism remains a problem. This appears even more acute because these same groups when surveyed on the characteristics most important in soldiers in general, listed motivation, attitude and technical skills ahead of self-discipline.

Recommendations

1. Inasmuch as the results of the study reaffirm the Army's recruiting emphasis on high school graduates and upper mental categories, the Army should continue its current recruiting policies with only minor modifications. More emphasis should be given to recruiting in middle class high schools by giving recruiters mission box substitution credit for individuals recruited from those schools. For example,

a recruiter with a I-IIIA male senior in his mission box could receive credit by enlisting in the DEP a category IIIB male senior from a middle class school.

2. The full impact of the recruiting efforts of the last year may not yet have been realized. Therefore, the comparisons of 1977-1980 enlistees to those of today may be questionable. In view of this, this study should be conducted again next year to compare these results as well as to compare the quality of the 1977-1980 enlistees with those being enlisted at that time.

3. The Westbrook study on alienation should be again conducted during the next year, surveying the same units, to determine if the recruiting efforts of the last two years have been successful in attracting a less alienated youth with values more compatible to those of the military.

4. The Army should further investigate the standards of discipline throughout the force.

5. Further studies, especially at the Command and General Staff College and the War College, should be conducted concerning the presence or absence of careerism in the middle level of Army management.

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APPENDIX 1

INSTRUCTIONS

SCN: ATZI-NCR-MA-82-9

During the last few years, a great deal of concern has been expressed about the quality of the young first term soldier. A great deal of research has been conducted on the subject with most of it being studies based on data and statistics (attrition rates, AFQT scores, educational level, etc.). Little research has been done which includes the opinions of the officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel most concerned.

This survey is being done as part of a research project on the quality of the US soldier by students of the US Army War College. It is designed to broaden the base of data on this important subject and to contribute in some measure to a better understanding of the concerns being expressed about the quality of our young soldiers.

This survey contains 26 items. It seeks information about you, your background, and your experience. It also asks your thoughts on the quality of the US soldier with emphasis on five areas: (1) intelligence, (2) motivation, (3) discipline, (4) attitude, and (5) technical competence.

An answer sheet is provided for you to record your responses to the questions. Please use a #2 pencil when filling in each answer space. No personal identification is required or desired. Choose only one answer for each question.

PLEASE DO NOT FOLD THE ANSWER SHEET!

SELECT ONLY ONE ANSWER

1. If you are an officer, what is your grade? (Leave blank if an enlisted member)
 1. O1-O2, W1-W2
 2. O3, W3
 3. O4, W4
 4. O5
 5. O6
2. If you are an enlisted member, what is your grade? (Leave blank if an officer)
 1. E1-E4
 2. E5
 3. E6
 4. E7
 5. E8-E9
3. What is your current assignment?
 1. Commander (Company, Battalion, DRC, Brigade)
 2. Staff Officer/NOO
 3. Sergeant Major/1st Sergeant/Assistant Area Commander
 4. Squad Leader/Platoon Sergeant/Tank Commander/Station Commander
 5. Squad, Team, or Crew Member/Recruiter
4. In what area is your current assignment?
 1. Combat Arms
 2. Combat Support
 3. Combat Service Support
 4. Recruiting
5. How many years of service have you completed?
 1. 3 or less
 2. 4 to 10
 3. 11 to 20
 4. Over 20
6. How old were you on your last birthday?
 1. 20 or younger
 2. 21-25
 3. 26-30
 4. 31-40
 5. 41 or older

7. What is the highest educational level you have completed?
 1. 11th grade or below
 2. High School Graduate/GED
 3. Some college but not a 4 year degree
 4. College graduate
8. Which one of the following choices best describes where you were raised?
 1. Farm/rural
 2. Town less than 25,000
 3. City 26,000 - 100,000
 4. City over 100,000
 5. Several of these places
9. What is your marital status?
 1. Married without children
 2. Married with children
 3. Divorced
 4. Single
10. Which characteristic do you consider most important in a soldier?
 1. Intelligence (Basic overall smartness)
 2. Positive attitude (Overall good feeling toward the Army - Willingness to do what is required)
 3. Strong self-motivation (Desire and drive to accomplish the mission)
 4. Self-discipline (Orientation to stay out of trouble and follow orders)
 5. Technical expertise or competence (Ability to do the job)
11. The biggest problem in today's first term soldier is:
 1. Lack of intelligence
 2. Lack of self-motivation
 3. Lack of discipline
 4. Lack of positive attitude
 5. Lack of technical skills
12. Which of the listed traits is your strongest trait as a soldier?
 1. Intelligence
 2. Positive attitude
 3. High self-motivation
 4. Self-discipline
 5. Technical proficiency

13. Which of the following types of soldiers would you most prefer to serve with?
1. Smart soldiers regardless of education
 2. Soldiers with at least a high school education
 3. Well disciplined and motivated soldiers regardless of intelligence
 4. Technically proficient soldiers
14. Quality in a soldier is mostly a result of:
1. Education background
 2. Early home or neighborhood environment
 3. Ethnic or racial group membership
 4. Intelligence one is born with
 5. Basic and AIT military training
15. The Army's biggest problem is recruiting:
1. Smart soldiers
 2. Self-motivated soldiers
 3. Disciplined soldiers
 4. Technically trainable soldiers
 5. Soldiers with a positive attitude
16. The Army's biggest problem is retaining or reenlisting:
1. Smart soldiers
 2. Self-motivated soldiers
 3. Disciplined soldiers
 4. Technically trainable soldiers
 5. Soldiers with a positive attitude
17. How intelligent is the average first term soldiers with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?
1. Highly intelligent
 2. Moderately intelligent
 3. Poor intelligence
18. How good is the attitude of the average first term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?
1. Good attitude
 2. Moderate attitude
 3. Poor attitude
19. How motivated is the average first term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?
1. Highly motivated
 2. Moderately motivated
 3. Poorly motivated

20. How disciplined is the average first term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?
1. Highly disciplined
 2. Moderately disciplined
 3. Poorly disciplined
21. How technically qualified is the average first term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?
1. Highly qualified
 2. Moderately qualified
 3. Poorly qualified
22. How intelligent is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?
1. Smarter now than in 1977-1980
 2. About the same
 3. Not as smart now as in 1977-1980
 4. No basis for comparison
23. How self-motivated is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?
1. More self-motivated now than in 1977-1980
 2. About the same
 3. Less self-motivated now than in 1977-1980
 4. No basis for comparison
24. How technically competent is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?
1. Technically more competent now than in 1977-1980
 2. About the same
 3. Technically less competent now than in 1977-1980
 4. No basis for comparison
25. How disciplined is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?
1. More disciplined now than in 1977-1980
 2. About the same
 3. Less disciplined now than in 1977-1980
 4. No basis for comparison

26. How is the attitude of the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?

1. Better attitude now than in 1977-1980
2. About the same
3. Worse attitude now than in 1977-1980
4. No basis for comparison

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND ASSISTANCE.

APPENDIX 2

TABLE 1

DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. Number of questionnaires analyzed: 1,829

2. By grade:

	\bar{x} (1)	s
O1-O2, W1-W2	71	3.9
O3, W3	178	9.7
O4, W4	138	7.6
O5	92	5.0
O6	53	2.9
E1-E4	370	20.2
E5	210	11.5
E6	360	19.7
E7	292	16.0
E8-E9	89	4.9

(1) Note: 24 responses out of range (1.4%)

3. Current assignment:

	\bar{x} (2)	s
Comdr (CO, Bn, DRC)	195	10.7
Staff Off/NOO	457	25.0
SGM/1SG/AAC	92	5.0
Sq Ldr/Plt Sgt/Stat CO	490	26.8
Sqd, Tm, Crew, Rctr	508	27.8

(2) Note: 87 responses out of range (4.8%)

4. Area of current assignment:

	\bar{x} (3)	s
Combat Amrs	716	39.1
Combat Support	320	17.5
Service Support:	320	17.5
Recruiting	420	23.0

(3) Note: 53 responses out of range (2.9%)

5. Years of service completed:

	\bar{x} (4)	s
3 or less	374	20.4
4 to 10	617	33.7
11 to 20	664	36.3
Over 20	157	8.6

(4) Note: 17 responses out of range (0.9%)

6. Age:

	\bar{x} (5)	s
20 or younger	154	8.4
21-25	386	21.1
26-30	402	22.0
31-40	699	38.2
41 or older	180	9.8

(5) Note: 8 responses out of range (0.4%)

7. Highest civilian education:

	\bar{x} (6)	s
11th Grade or Below	71	3.9
High School/GED	626	34.2
Some College	582	31.8
College Graduate	544	29.7

(6) Note: 6 responses out of range (0.3%)

8. Area in which raised:

	\bar{x} (7)	s
Farm/Rural	469	25.6
Town < 25,000	374	20.4
City 26,000-100,000	382	20.9
City > 100,000	346	18.9
Several Places	247	13.5

(7) Note: 11 responses out of range (0.6%)

9. Marital status:

	\bar{x} (8)	s
Married - No children	203	11.1
Married - Children	1115	61.0
Divorced	128	7.0
Single	371	20.3

(8) Note: 12 responses out of range (0.7%)

APPENDIX 3

INSTRUCTIONS

SCN: ATZI-NCR-MA-82-9

During the last few years, a great deal of concern has been expressed about the quality of the young first term soldier. A great deal of research has been conducted on the subject with most of it being studies based on data and statistics (attrition rates, AFQT scores, educational level, etc.). Little research has been done which includes the opinions of the officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel most concerned.

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This survey contains 26 items. It seeks information about you, your background, and your experience. It also asks your thoughts on the quality of the U.S. soldier with emphasis on five areas: (1) intelligence, (2) motivation, (3) discipline, (4) attitude, and (5) technical competence.

An answer sheet is provided for you to record your responses to the questions. Please use a #2 pencil when filling in each answer space. No personal identification is required or desired. Choose only one answer for each question.

PLEASE DO NOT FOLD THE ANSWER SHEET!

SELECT ONLY ONE ANSWER

1. If you are an officer, what is your grade? (Leave blank if an enlisted member)

71	1.	O1-O2, W1-W2
178	2.	O3, W3
139	3.	O4, W4
92	4.	O5
53	5.	O6
2. If you are an enlisted member, what is your grade? (Leave blank if an officer)

370	1.	E1-E4
210	2.	E5
360	3.	E6
292	4.	E7
89	5.	E8-E9
3. What is your current assignment?

195	1.	Commander (Company, Battalion, DRC, Brigade)
457	2.	Staff Officer/NCO
92	3.	Sergeant Major/1st Sergeant/Assistant Area Commander
490	4.	Squad, Leader/Platoon Sergeant/Tank Commander/ Station Commander
508	5.	Squad, Team, or Crew Member/Recruiter
4. In what area is your current assignment?

716	1.	Combat Arms
320	2.	Combat Support
320	3.	Combat Service Support
420	4.	Recruiting
5. How many years of service have you completed?

374	1.	3 or less
617	2.	4 to 10
664	3.	11 to 20
157	4.	Over 20
6. How old were you on your last birthday?

154	1.	20 or younger
386	2.	21-25
402	3.	26-30
699	4.	31-40
180	5.	41 or older

7. What is the highest educational level you have completed?

- 71 1. 11th grade or below
- 626 2. High School Graduate/GED
- 582 3. Some college but not a 4 year degree
- 544 4. College Graduate

8. Which one of the following choices best describes where you were raised?

- 469 1. Farm/rural
- 374 2. Town less than 25,000
- 382 3. City 26,000 - 100,000
- 346 4. City over 100,000
- 247 5. Several of these places

9. What is your marital status?

- 203 1. Married without children
- 1115 2. Married with children
- 128 3. Divorced
- 371 4. Single

10. Which characteristic do you consider most important in a soldier?

- 81 1. Intelligence (Basic overall smartness)
- 665 2. Positive attitude (Overall good feeling toward the Army - Willingness to do what is required)
- 678 3. Strong self-motivation (Desire and drive to accomplish the mission)
- 228 4. Self-discipline (Orientation to stay out of trouble and follow orders)
- 174 5. Technical expertise or competence (Ability to do the job)

11. The biggest problem in today's first term soldier is:

- 112 1. Lack of intelligence
- 548 2. Lack of self-motivation
- 611 3. Lack of discipline
- 413 4. Lack of positive attitude
- 135 5. Lack of technical skills

12. Which of the listed traits is your strongest trait as a soldier?

- 153 1. Intelligence
- 309 2. Positive attitude
- 435 3. High self-motivation
- 694 4. Self-discipline
- 223 5. Technical proficiency

13. Which of the following types of soldiers would you most prefer to serve with?

- 186 1. Smart soldiers regardless of education
- 60 2. Soldiers with at least a high school education
- 1311 3. Well disciplined and motivated soldiers regardless of intelligence
- 259 4. Technically proficient soldiers

14. Quality in a soldier is mostly a result of:

- 193 1. Educational background
- 1132 2. Early home or neighborhood environment
- 37 3. Ethnic or racial group membership
- 82 4. Intelligence one is born with
- 374 5. Basic and AIT military training

15. The Army's biggest problem is recruiting:

- 220 1. Smart soldiers
- 474 2. Self-motivated soldiers
- 347 3. Disciplined soldiers
- 294 4. Technically trainable soldiers
- 475 5. Soldiers with a positive attitude

16. The Army's biggest problem is retaining or reenlisting:

- 280 1. Smart soldiers
- 514 2. Self-motivated soldiers
- 226 3. Disciplined soldiers
- 405 4. Technically trainable soldiers
- 386 5. Soldiers with a positive attitude

17. How intelligent is the average first term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?

- 157 1. Highly intelligent
- 1362 2. Moderately intelligent
- 288 3. Poor intelligence

18. How good is the attitude of the average first term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?

- 434 1. Good attitude
- 1061 2. Moderate attitude
- 322 3. Poor attitude

19. How motivated is the average first term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?

- 233 1. Highly motivated
- 1204 2. Moderately motivated
- 377 3. Poorly motivated

20. How disciplined is the average first term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?
- 142 1. Highly disciplined
1098 2. Moderately disciplined
575 3. Poorly disciplined
21. How technically qualified is the average first term soldier with whom you currently serve or whom you have recently recruited?
- 171 1. Highly qualified
1132 2. Moderately qualified
445 3. Poorly qualified
22. How intelligent is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?
- 426 1. Smarter now than in 1977-1980
627 2. About the same
315 3. Not as smart now as in 1977-1980
438 4. No basis for comparison
23. How self-motivated is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?
- 261 1. More self-motivated now than in 1977-1980
691 2. About the same
506 3. Less self-motivated now than in 1977-1980
348 4. No basis for comparison
24. How technically competent is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?
- 285 1. Technically more competent now than in 1977-1980
748 2. About the same
383 3. Technically less competent now than in 1977-1980
388 4. No basis for comparison
25. How disciplined is the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?
- 184 1. More disciplined now than in 1977-1980
624 2. About the same
671 3. Less disciplined now than in 1977-1980
320 4. No basis for comparison

26. How is the attitude of the soldier recently recruited or assigned to your unit compared to those who entered the Army during 1977-1980?

- | | |
|-----|--|
| 307 | 1. Better attitude now than in 1977-1980 |
| 694 | 2. About the same |
| 452 | 3. Worse attitude now than in 1977-1980 |
| 332 | 4. No basis for comparison |

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND ASSISTANCE.

APPENDIX 4

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF SURVEY DATA

04-22-82 FILE - NNAME -- CREATED 04-22-82

001 OFFICER GRADE

CODE

```

      I
1    *** (    71)
      I 01-02 , W1-W2
      I
      I
2    ***** (   178)
      I 03 , W3
      I
      I
3    *** (   139)
      I 04 , W4
      I
      I
4    ** (    92)
      I 05
      I
      I
5    * (    53)
      I 06
      I
      I
(WILD) ***** ( 1296)
      I
      I
      I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
      0          400          800          1200          1600          2000
      FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	2.771	STD ERR	0.051	MEDIAN	2.626
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.170	VARIANCE	1.387
KURTOSIS	-0.765	SKENNESS	0.327	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	533	MISSING CASES	1296		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

.002 ENLISTED GRADE

CODE

```

      I
      I
1 ***** ( 370)
      I E1-E4
      I
      I
      I
2 ***** ( 210)
      I E5
      I
      I
      I
3 ***** ( 360)
      I E6
      I
      I
      I
4 ***** ( 292)
      I
      I
      I
      I
5 ***** ( 89)
      I E8-E9
      I
      I
      I
(WILD) ***** ( 508)
      I
      I
      I
      I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
      0          200          400          600          800          1000
      FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	2.637	STD ERR	0.035	MEDIAN	2.724
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.280	VARIANCE	1.63
KURTOSIS	-1.171	SKEWNESS	0.093	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	1321	MISSING CASES	508		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

003 CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

CODE

```

I
1 ***** ( 195)
I  CMDR {CD, BN; DRC, B
I
I
2 ***** ( 457)
I  STAFF OFF - NCO
I
I
3 ***** ( 92)
I  SGM-1SG-AAC
I
I
4 ***** ( 490)
I  SQ LDR-PLT SGT-STAT
I
I
5 ***** ( 508)
I  SQD,TEAM,CPEQ,RCTR
I

```

(WILD) ***** (97)

```

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
0      200      400      600      800      1000
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	3.378	STD ERR	0.034	MEDIAN	3.759
MODE	5.000	STD DEV	1.420	VARIANCE	2.016
KURTOSIS	-1.377	SKEWNESS	-0.309	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	1742	MISSING CASES	87		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

004 AREA OF CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

CODE

```

I
1 ***** ( 716 )
I COMBAT ARMS
I
I
2 ***** ( 320 )
I COMBAT SUPPORT
I
I
3 ***** ( 320 )
I SERVICE SUPPORT
I
I
4 ***** ( 420 )
I RECRUITING
I
I
(WILD) *** ( 53 )
I
I
I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
0      200      400      600      800      1000
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	2.250	STD ERR	0.029	MEDIAN	2.037
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.211	VARIANCE	1.463
KURTOSIS	-1.486	SKEWNESS	0.312	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	1776	MISSING CASES	53		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

Q05 YEARS OF SERVICE COMPLETED

CODE

```

I
1 ***** ( 374)
I 3 OR LESS
I
I
2 ***** ( 617)
I 4 TO 10
I
I
3 ***** ( 664)
I 11 TO 20
I
I
4 ***** ( 157)
I OVER 20
I
(WILD) ** ( 17)
I
I
I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
^          200          400          600          800          1000
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	2.333	STD ERR	0.021	MEDIAN	2.362
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.899	VARIANCE	0.809
KURTOSIS	-0.860	SKEWNESS	0.011	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	1812	MISSING CASES	17		

04-22-82

FILE - NOHAME - CREATED 04-22-82

006 AGE

CODE

```

      I
      1 ***** ( 154)
      I 20 OR YOUNGER
      I
      I
      2 ***** ( 386)
      I 21-25
      I
      I
      3 ***** ( 402)
      I 26-30
      I
      I
      4 ***** ( 699)
      I 31-40
      I
      I
      5 ***** ( 180)
      I 41 OR OLDER
      I
      I
(WILD) * ( 8)
      I
      I
      I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
      0      200      400      600      800      1000
      FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	3.200	STD ERR	0.027	MEDIAN	3.422
MODE	4.000	STD DEV	1.136	VARIANCE	1.290
KURTOSIS	-0.823	SKEWNESS	-0.340	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	1821	MISSING CASES	8		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

Q07 HIGHEST CIVILIAN EDUCATION

CODE

```

I
1 ***** ( 71)
I 11TH GRADE OR BELOW
I
I
2 ***** ( 626)
I HIGH SCH - GED
I
I
3 ***** ( 582)
I SOME COLLEGE
I
I
4 ***** ( 544)
I COLLEGE GRAD
I
I

```

(WILD) * (6)

```

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
C      200      400      600      800     1000
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	2.277	STD ERR	0.021	MEDIAN	2.869
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.885	VARIANCE	0.783
KURTOSIS	-1.103	SKEWNESS	-0.096	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	1823	MISSING CASES	6		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

008 AREA IN WHICH RAISED

```

CODE
1 ***** ( 469)
  I FARM-RURAL
  I
  I
2 ***** ( 374)
  I TOWN < 25,000
  I
  I
3 ***** ( 382)
  I CITY 26,000-100,000
  I
  I
4 ***** ( 346)
  I CITY > 100,000
  I
  I
5 ***** ( 247)
  I SEVERAL PLACES
  I
  I
(WILD) ** ( 11)
  I
  I
  I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
  0      100      200      300      400      500
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	2.740	STD ERR	0.032	MEDIAN	2.673
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.380	VARIANCE	1.905
KURTOSIS	-1.221	SKEWNESS	0.194	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	1818	MISSING CASES	11		

04-22-82 FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

009 MARITAL STATUS

CODE

- I
 1 ***** (203)
 I MARRIED-NO CHILD
 I
 I
 2 ***** (1115)
 I MARRIED-CHILDREN
 I
 I
 3 **** (128)
 I DIVORCED
 I
 I
 4 ***** (371)
 I SINGLE
 I
 I

(WILD) * (12)

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 C 400 800 1200 1600 2000
 FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.367	STD ERR	0.022	MEDIAN	2.133
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.930	VARIANCE	0.865
KURTOSIS	-0.501	SKEWNESS	0.736	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	1817	MISSING CASES	12		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

Q10 MOST IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF SOLDIER

CODE

- I
 1 ***** (81)
 I INTELLIGENCE
 I
 I
 2 ***** (665)
 I POSITIVE ATTITUDE
 I
 I
 3 ***** (678)
 I SELF-MOTIVATION
 I
 I
 4 ***** (228)
 I SELF-DISCIPLINE
 I
 I
 5 ***** (174)
 I TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
 I
 I

(WILD) * (3)

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 200 400 600 800 1000
 FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.863	STD ERR	0.024	MEDIAN	2.746
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	1.015	VARIANCE	1.029
KURTOSIS	-0.225	SKEWNESS	0.571	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	1826	MISSING CASES	3		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

011 BIGGEST PROBLEM IN FIRST TERM SOLDIERS

CODE

- I
 1 ***** (112)
 I INTELLIGENCE
 I
 I
 2 ***** (548)
 I SELF-MOTIVATION
 I
 I
 3 ***** (611)
 I DISCIPLINE
 I
 I
 4 ***** (413)
 I POSITIVE ATTITUDE
 I
 I
 5 ***** (135)
 I TECHNICAL SKILLS
 I
 I

(WILD) ** (10)

I
 I
 I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 200 400 600 800 1000
 FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.951	STD ERR	0.024	MEDIAN	2.908
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	1.034	VARIANCE	1.070
KURTOSIS	-0.617	SKEWNESS	0.167	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	1919	MISSING CASES	10		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

012 STRONGEST TRAIT AS A SOLDIER

CODE

```

I
1 ***** ( 158)
I INTELLEGECE
I
I
2 ***** ( 435)
I SELF-MOTIVATION
I
I
3 ***** ( 694)
I DISCIPLINE
I
I
4 ***** ( 309)
I POSITIVE ATTITUDE
I
I
5 ***** ( 223)
I TECHNICAL SKILLS
I
(WILD) ** ( 10)
I
I
I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
0      200      400      600      800      1000
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	3.002	STD ERR	0.026	MEDIAN	2.956
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	1.117	VARIANCE	1.248
KURTOSIS	-0.581	SKEWNESS	0.150	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	1819	MISSING CASES	10		

04-22-82 FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

Q13 SOLDIER MOST PERFER TO SERVE WITH

CODE

- I
- 1 ***** (186)
- I SMART -EDUCATION OPT
- I
- I
- 2 *** (60)
- I AT LEAST HS EDUCATED
- I
- I
- 3 ***** (1311)
- I DISCIPLINE-MOTIVATED
- I
- I
- 4 ***** (259)
- I TECHNICALLY PROFICIE
- I
- I

(WILD) * (13)

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 400 800 1200 1600 2000
 FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.905	STD ERR	0.016	MEDIAN	3.005
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.759	VARIANCE	0.577
KURTOSIS	1.757	SKEWNESS	-1.245	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	1816	MISSING CASES	13		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

014 QUALITY OF SOLDIER MOSTLY A RESULT OF

CODE

```

      I
      1 ***** ( 193)
      I EDUCATION
      I
      I
      2 ***** ( 1132)
      I HOME-NEIGHBORHOOD
      I
      I
      3 ** ( 37)
      I BORN INTELLIGENCE
      I
      I
      4 *** ( 82)
      I BASIC-AJT TRAINING
      I
      I
      5 ***** ( 374)
      I
      I
      I
(WILD) * ( 11)
      I
      I
      I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
      0      400      800      1200      1600      2000
      FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	2.622	STD ERR	0.031	MEDIAN	2.133
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.332	VARIANCE	1.773
KURTOSIS	-0.587	SKEWNESS	0.969	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	1818	MISSING CASES	11		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

Q15 BIGGEST PROBLEM IS RECRUITING:

CODE

```

1 ***** ( 220)
  I SMART SOLDIERS
  I
  I
2 ***** ( 474)
  I SELF-MOTIVATED
  I
  I
3 ***** ( 347)
  I DISCIPLINED
  I
  I
4 ***** ( 294)
  I TECHNICALLY TRAINABLE
  I
  I
5 ***** ( 475)
  I POSITIVE ATTITUDE
  I
  I
(WILD) *** ( 19)
  I
  I
  I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
  0      100      200      300      400      500
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	3.182	STD ERR	0.033	MEDIAN	3.108
MODE	5.000	STD DEV	1.389	VARIANCE	1.928
KURTOSIS	-1.329	SKEWNESS	-0.012	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		

VALID CASES	1810	MISSING CASES	19
-------------	------	---------------	----

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

016 BIGGEST PROBLEM RETAINING-REENLISTING:

CODE

```

      I
      1 ***** ( 280)
      I SMART SOLDEIRS
      I
      I
      2 ***** ( 514)
      I SELF-MOTIVATED
      I
      I
      3 ***** ( 226)
      I DISCIPLINED
      I
      I
      4 ***** ( 405)
      I TECHNICALLY TRAINABL
      I
      I
      5 ***** ( 386)
      I POSITIVE ATTITUDE
      I
      I
(WILD) ** ( 18)
      I
      I
      I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
      0      200      400      600      800      1000
      FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	3.057	STD ERR	0.033	MEDIAN	2.993
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.406	VARIANCE	1.976
KURTOSIS	-1.376	SKEWNESS	0.026	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		
VALID CASES	1611	MISSING CASES	18		

04-22-82

FILE - .NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

Q18 ATTITUDE OF AVG FIRST TERM SOLDIERS

CODE

```

      I
      1 ***** ( 434)
      I  HIGHLY
      I
      I
      2 ***** ( 1061)
      I  MODERATE
      I
      I
      3 ***** ( 322)
      I  POORLY
      I
      I
(WILD) * ( 12)
      I
      I
      I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
      0          400          800          1200          1600          2000
      FREQUENCY
  
```

MEAN	1.938	STD ERR	0.015	MEDIAN	1.947
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.642	VARIANCE	0.412
KURTOSIS	-0.584	SKEWNESS	0.056	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	1317	MISSING CASES	12		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

Q19 HOW MOTIVATED IS AVG FIRST TERM SOLDIER

CODE

1 ***** (233)
 I HIGHLY
 I
 I
 2 ***** (1204)
 I MODERATE
 I
 I
 3 ***** (377)
 I POORLY
 I
 I

(WILD) * (15)

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 400 800 1200 1600 2000
 FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.079	STD ERR	0.013	MEDIAN	2.060
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.575	VARIANCE	0.330
KURTOSIS	-0.024	SKEWNESS	0.002	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	1614	MISSING CASES	15		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

021 HOW TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED

CODE

1 ***** (171)
I HIGHLYI
I
2 ***** (1132)
I MODERATEI
I
3 ***** (495)
I POORLY

(WILD) ** (31)

I
I
I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000
FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.180	STD ERR	0.014	MEDIAN	2.143
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.581	VARIANCE	0.338
KURTOSIS	-0.287	SKEWNESS	-0.042	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	1798	MISSING CASES	31		

04-22-82

FILE - NOHAME - CREATED 04-22-82

022 INTELLIGENCE OF CURRENT TO ARMY OF 77-80

CODE

```

I
1 ***** ( 426)
I BETTER THAN 77-80
I
I
2 ***** ( 627)
I ABOUT SAME
I
I
3 ***** ( 315)
I LESS THAN 77-80
I
I
4 ***** ( 438)
I CAN NOT COMPARE
I
I
(WILD) 23)
I
I
I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
0      200      400      600      800      1000
FREQUENCY
    
```

MEAN	2.424	STD ERR	0.026	MEDIAN	2.261
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	1.096	VARIANCE	1.202
KURTOSIS	-1.269	SKEWNESS	0.210	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	1806	MISSING CASES	23		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

023 SELF MOTIVATION OF CURRENT TO AMTY 77-80

CODE

```

I
1 ***** ( 261)
I BETTER THAN 77-80
I
I
2 ***** ( 691)
I ABOUT SAME
I
I
3 ***** ( 506)
I LESS THAN 77-80
I
I
4 ***** ( 348)
I CAN NOT COMPARE
I
I

```

(WILD) ** (23)

```

I
I
I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
C      200      400      600      800      1000
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	2.521	STD ERR	0.023	MEDIAN	2.429
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.962	VARIANCE	0.924
KURTOSIS	-0.963	SKEWNESS	0.193	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	1806	MISSING CASES	23		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

Q24 TECHNICALLY COMPETENCE-CURRENT TO 77-80

CODE

- I
 1 ***** (285)
 I BETTER THAN 77-80
 I
 I
 2 ***** (748)
 I ABOUT SAME
 I
 I
 3 ***** (383)
 I LESS THAN 77-80
 I
 I
 4 ***** (388)
 I CAN NOT COMPARE
 I
 I

(WILD) ** (25)

I
 I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 200 400 600 800 1000
 FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.484	STD ERR	0.024	MEDIAN	2.325
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.998	VARIANCE	0.996
KURTOSIS	-1.044	SKEWNESS	0.215	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	1804	MISSING CASES	25		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

026 ATTITUDE OF CURRENT TO ARMY OF 77-80

CODE

```

      I
      1 ***** ( 307)
      I BETTER THAN 77-80
      I
      I
      2 ***** ( 694)
      I ABOUT SAME
      I
      I
      3 ***** ( 452)
      I LESS THAN 77-80
      I
      I
      4 ***** ( 332)
      I CAN NOT COMPARE
      I
      I
(WILD) *** ( 44)
      I
      I
      I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
      C      200      400      600      800      1000
      FREQUENCY

```

MEAN	2.453	STD ERR	0.023	MEDIAN	2.344
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.982	VARIANCE	0.964
KURTOSIS	-0.985	SKEWNESS	0.175	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	1785	MISSING CASES	44		

04-22-82

FILE - NONAME - CREATED 04-22-82

027 SURVEY SITE

CODE

I
 1 **** (127)
 I WAR COLLEGE
 I
 I
 2 *** (90)
 I C & GSC
 I
 I
 3 ***** (253)
 I TRAINING
 I
 I

(WILD) ***** (1359)

I
 I
 I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 400 800 1200 1600 2000
 FREQUENCY

MEAN	2.268	STD ERR	0.040	MEDIAN	2.571
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.859	VARIANCE	0.738
KURTOSIS	-1.428	SKEWNESS	-0.545	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	470	MISSING CASES	1359		

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